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The Sisyphean purgatory of penetrate and patch to which users of commodity systems are 
currently subjected has lead to increasing recognition that platforms with assurance of penetration 
resistance and non-bypassability are required for certain critical functions. This need for high 
assurance calls for a layered system architecture where enforcement mechanisms of the most 
critical policies themselves depend upon layers of no less assurance.    In the past, the solution 
offered was a general-purpose security kernel.  For many high assurance systems currently being 
planned or developed, a general-purpose kernel provides more functionality than necessary. This 
has resulted in increased interest in the use of separation kernels to support real-time embedded 
systems and as the basis for virtual machine monitors (VMM).  Many of these separation kernels 
are minimized to have both static policies and static allocation of resources, such as would be 
suitable for certain fixed-configuration or embedded environments.   
The relevance of the separation kernel concept is demonstrated by the many current systems and 
projects that utilize them. A few U.S. systems where embedded separation kernels will be 
deployed include: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F-22, Joint Tactical Radio System, C-17 
Globemaster III, and  Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle [27].  The JSF requires the evaluation and 
certification at EAL7 [27].  Separation kernels will also be used in communications security 
modernization efforts, where a single processor board will be used to manage cryptography for 
information at a variety of classification levels [6].  VMM implementations in development 
include VMware [10], the Xen project [3], the Denali project[44], and Microsoft’s NGSCB 
project [5][11][29][12].   
Despite the resurgence of interest in the separation kernel approach, the principle of least 
privilege [39] is often overlooked in the design of traditional separation kernels due to the belief 
that a separation kernel should only be concerned with resource isolation.  Consequences of this 
omission include problems relating to all-or-nothing security and over-privileged programs. For 
systems that must protect highly sensitive or highly valuable resources, e.g., the JSF, formal 
verification of the ability of the system to enforce its security policy is required.  Recent advances 
in the assurance requirements for high assurance systems[31] have included verification of the 
target system’s conformance to the principle of least privilege. To provide vendors and 
integrators with tools to formally describe least privilege in separation kernels, a least privilege 
separation model is offered.  
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1.1 A Least Privileged Separation Kernel 
In the context of a research project to build a high assurance separation kernel, we have extended 
the separation kernel abstraction so that the principle of least privilege can be examined at the 
model level and enforced by systems that conform to that model.   
The traditional separation kernel paradigm describes a security policy in which activities in 
different blocks of a partitioned system are not visible to other blocks, except perhaps for certain 
specified flows allowed between blocks. (Here, “block” is defined in the traditional mathematical 
sense as a member of the non-intersecting set of elements that comprise the partition [34].) If 
information flow is described only at the block level, then everything in a block can flow to 
everything in another block. This would be contrary to the principle of least privilege required in 
high assurance systems. The least privilege separation model presented here builds on the 
traditional separation abstraction by extending the granularity of described elements to the 
subjects [25] and resources within the partition.  An orthogonal flow control policy can then be 
expressed relative to subjects and resources. Thus, a high assurance separation kernel can provide 
all of the functionality and protection of the traditional separation kernel, combined with a high 
level of confidence that the effects of subjects’ activities may be minimized to their intended 
scope.   
In the sections that follow we will elaborate on the concept of separation kernels and the need for 
least privilege in such systems.  In particular, the granularity of inter-block flows will be 
discussed and the requirement for the subject abstraction will be described. A formalization of the 
least privilege separation model is presented and several aspects of secure system design and 
verification are discussed with respect to the model. The last sections of the paper review related 
work, and summarize our results. 
2 Concepts 
2.1 The Separation Kernel 
The term separation kernel was introduced in the early 1980s and has since become a term of art 
[37].  Rushby originally proposed, in the context of a distributed system, that a separation kernel 
creates “within a single shared machine, an environment which supports the various components 
of the system, and provides the communications channels between them, in such a way that 
individual components of the system cannot distinguish this shared environment from a 
physically distributed one.”   
A separation kernel divides all resources under its control into blocks such that the actions of an 
active entity (i.e., a subject) in one block are isolated from (viz., cannot be detected by or 
communicated to) an active entity in another block, unless an explicit means for that 
communication has been established (e.g., via configuration data). Separation kernels are 
typically employed as the basic underlying component of many embedded applications, operating 
systems, or virtual machine monitors. For a multilevel secure system, each block typically 
represents a different classification level. 
A separation kernel achieves isolation of subjects in different blocks by virtualization of shared 
resources: each block encompasses a resource set that appears to be entirely its own.  To achieve 
this objective for resources that can only be utilized by one subject at a time, such as the CPU, the 
ideal separation kernel must ensure that the temporal usage patterns from different blocks are not 
apparent to each other. Other resources, such as memory, may be accessed by different blocks 
simultaneously, while preserving idealized isolation, if the separation kernel ensures, for 
example, that blocks are allocated different and non-interacting portions of the resource.  
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Furthermore, kernel utilization of its own internal resources must also preserve the desired 
isolation properties. 
2.1.1 Application of the Separation Concept 
The conceptual model of separation is commonly used to create Virtual Machine Monitors 
(VMM), which provide efficient, isolated programming environments that replicate the real 
machine environment.  These mimicked environments are referred to as virtual machines. 
[17][33].   However, a separation kernel differs from a VMM in that it is not required to exactly 
replicate the underlying hardware base to to its application.  Preventing illegal information flow 
between isolated blocks is the primary common functionality between a separation kernel and a 
VMM, and is the reason that the separation kernel provides an ideal foundation upon which to 
build a secure VMM.   
Goldberg defines a virtual machine (VM) as: "a hardware-software duplicate of a real existing 
computer system in which a statistically dominant subset of the virtual processor's instructions 
execute on the host processor in native mode" [17].  A VMM mediates between the virtual 
machine(s) and the real resources of the computer system. Benefits of VMMs include the ability 
of the VMM administrator to configure the execution environment of the VMs, support for the 
concurrent use of several different operating systems, isolation of the VMs, and flexibility for 
upgrades or modifications to the VM operating systems and applications. If both security and 
performance are requirements, then, to succeed, the partitioning performed by the VMM must 
ensure that the virtual machines are isolated from one another such that information flows 
between them are constrained, while providing support for a variety of operating systems and 
imposing minimal performance degradation.  
Process isolation is another application of the resource separation concept.   The separation 
mechanism to isolate execution domains (e.g., process address spaces) such that one domain 
cannot interfere with another domain has been implemented in both hardware (e.g., Intel IA-32 
architecture [20]) and the security kernel [13].  Unlike a traditional security kernel that enforces a 
multilevel access control policy and performs the most trusted functions for a secure operating 
system, a separation kernel concerns itself only with the partitioning of resources and flow 
control.   
When applied to embedded military systems, the separation kernel’s resource partitioning is 
commonly used to enforce both avionics-related policies and security policies. As these safety-
oriented avionics systems are used increasingly to process sensitive data, they will be scrutinized 
with respect to high-level standardized functional security and assurance requirements. Such 
criteria differ from the assessment standards for flight safety certification (e.g. RTCA/DO-178B 
Level A [36]) in that they articulate security’s negative requirement that the absence of 
unspecified functionality be demonstrated: safety requirements provide no assurance against 
malicious software or malicious developers. Many of the security challenges for avionics systems 
can be addressed through the application of high assurance separation kernels. 
2.2 The Principle of Least Privilege 
In 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder concluded that least privilege is one of the eight design principles 
that can reduce design flaws [39].  They defined least privilege by stating “every program and 
every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the 
job.  Primarily, this principle limits the damage that can result from an accident or error.  It also 
reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the minimum for 
correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to 
occur.”  A decade later, the U.S. Department of Defense included a similar definition of least 
privilege in the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [43]. Layering, 
modularity and information hiding are constructive techniques for least privilege that can be 
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applied to the internal architecture of the underlying trusted foundation (e.g., separation kernel) to 
improve the system’s resistance to penetration.  The kernel can also be configured to utilize 
protection mechanisms such as access control and fine-grained execution domains to limit the 
abilities of a subject so that it is constrained to perform only the tasks for which it is authorized.  
An example of the enforcement of least privilege is in modern operating systems such as would 
execute on a VMM. These operating systems require a minimum of two protection modes: one 
for the OS itself and one for application processes executing under the control of the OS. The 
operating system will view its relationship to applications as privileged. It will have access to 
virtualized privileged instructions that will permit it to manage memory, set and reset protection 
bits, control shared I/O resources, etc. Application processes are supposed to be less privileged.  
Without a mechanism such as multiple protection modes to enforce least privilege, a typical 
operating system executing within a VMM block would be at the mercy of its application 
processes, just as the VMM or separation kernel would be at the mercy of the operating system 
without similar hierarchical separation.  By including a least privilege mechanism, presumably by 
utilizing hardware support, it is possible to provide both the separation kernel and the operating 
system with a simple, high assurance self-protection mechanism. 
2.3 High Assurance and Least Privilege 
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) specifies the principle of least 
privilege as a system architecture requirement for high assurance evaluation classes (B2 to A1) 
[43].  While this requirement is noticeably absent in version 2.1 of the CC, even at the highest 
evaluation assurance level (EAL7), efforts are underway to correct this omission[31]. Despite the 
lack of an explicit reference to the principle of least privilege, the Common Criteria (CC) 
provides the groundwork for it in several ways. It defines assurance as “grounds for confidence 
that an entity meets its security objectives.” [4]   The CC explains that the correctness and 
effectiveness of the security functions are the primary factors for establishing the assurance that 
security objectives are met. A high assurance separation kernel must be proven to correctly 
implement the security functions defined in its specifications and effectively mitigate risks to a 
level commensurate with the value of the assets it protects.  To complement the formal proof, a 
constructive analysis is used to demonstrate that the implementation maps to the specification. 
Thus, a focus on resource separation and the structured allotment of privileges affords simplicity 
to the separation kernel, and enables a high assurance analysis of the correctness of its 
implementation. 
In practice, a separation kernel providing strict isolation is of little value. Controlled relaxation of 
strict separation allows applications to interact in useful ways, including participation in the 
enforcement of application-level policies. In the latter case, applications hosted on a separation 
kernel will need to be examined and evaluated to ensure that the overall system security policies 
are enforced. A monolithic application that runs with the same set of privileges throughout all of 
its modules and processes is hard to evaluate.  In order to reason about the assurance properties of 
the system, the applications should be decomposed into components requiring varying levels of 
privilege.  Such decomposition is more meaningful if the privilege boundaries are enforced by the 
separation kernel, rather than relying on, for example, error-prone ad hoc agreements between 
programmers or integrators.  The principle of least privilege affords a greater degree of scrutiny 
to the evaluation of both the kernel and the application, resulting in a higher level of assurance 
that the overall system security objectives are met.   
3 Inter-Block Flows  
The first-order goal of a separation kernel is to provide absolute separation of the (effects of) 
activities occurring in different blocks.  In practice, however, separation kernels are often used to 
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share hardware among kindred activities that have reason to communicate in some controllable 
fashion. If there were not some such commonality, the need to share hardware would be less 
compelling.  In other words, absolute separation of blocks is not so useful.  Therefore, we include 
in the separation kernel a policy and mechanism for the controlled sharing of information 
between blocks. 
The control of information flow between blocks can be expressed abstractly in an access matrix, 
as shown in the example of Table 1.  This allows arbitrary sharing to be defined, establishing the 































Table 1.   Example Block-to-Block Flow Matrix 
Notice that an inter-block flow policy in which the flow relationships partially order the blocks, 
such as in Table 1, may be suitable for the enforcement by the separation kernel of a multilevel 
confidentiality or integrity policy if meaningful sensitivity labels are immutable attributes of the 
blocks.1  In this example, information flows (represented by ⇒) form the following ordering:  
Block A ⇒ Block B ⇒ Block C.   An assignment of labels to these blocks in conjunction with 
the rules defined in Table 1 results in a recognizable multilevel security policy: 
 Block A := Unclassified 
 Block B := Secret 
Block C := Top Secret 
The block-to-block flow policy allows all of the information in a “source” block (e.g., Block A, 
above) to flow to every element of a “target” block (e.g., Block B, above).  Extending the Table 1 
scenario, if block B is also allowed to write to block A, for example to implement a downgrade 
function with respect to the assigned labels, then all of the code or program(s) in block B would 
need to be examined to ensure that their activities correspond to the intended downgrading 
semantics.  If this assurance of correct behavior cannot be provided, such a circular flow (A ⇒ B 
⇒ A) would create, in effect, one large policy equivalence class consisting of all of the 
information in blocks A and B. 
To limit the effects of block-to-block flows, we next introduce the notion of controlling how 
much information is to be allowed to flow between and within blocks. 
4 Least Privilege Flow Control 
The implementation of a separation kernel results in the creation of active entities (subjects) that 
execute under the control of the separation kernel and the virtualization of system resources 
exported at the kernel interface (see Figure 1). Historically, many security models have utilized 
the abstraction of an object.[25] Objects have been classified in various ways (such as data object, 
storage object and named object) and there have been various approaches for defining devices 
and other system resources in terms of objects.  We decided to avoid this nomenclature issue by 
                                                
1 Because a static separation kernel does not change the policy or resource allocation during execution, and 
assuming that the policy is not changed while the separation kernel is shut down, the policy may be 
considered to be global and persistent, viz. non-discretionary. 
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simply modeling "resources."  Similarly, as the definition of “resources” includes the abstractions 
that are exported by the separation kernel, "subjects" are defined to be a type of resource.  
Resources are defined as the totality of all hardware, firmware and software and data that are 
executed, utilized, created, protected or exported by the separation kernel.  Exported resources 
are those resources (including subjects) to which an explicit reference is possible via the 
separation kernel interface.  That interface may include programming, administrative, and other 
interfaces. In contrast, internal resources are those resources for which no explicit reference is 
possible via the separation kernel interface.  
Certain implementations of separation kernels elect to describe the system only in terms of blocks 
and have not chosen to describe the active system entities that cause information flow.  Since the 
concept of subjects is a term of art [25], and for good reason, we will use it to describe the active 
entities in the separation kernel. We have found the use of the subject abstraction to be 
indispensable for reasoning about security in secure systems. Without the subject abstraction, it 
may be difficult to understand, for example, which block in a partitioned system is the cause of a 
flow between blocks (e.g., the flow could have been caused by the receiving block as a reader or 
by the sending block as a writer), which application programs within a block need to be trusted 
(e.g., evaluated with respect to the security policy), and how to minimally configure the programs 
and resources of such a system to achieve the principle of least privilege. Just as when writing 
prose, if actions are described passively (i.e., not attributable to the subject of a sentence) the 
cause of the action can be ambiguous. In addition, use of subjects permits construction of a 
resource-to-block allocation that provides a minimal configuration for least privilege (see Section 
4.3).   
Modeling of subjects within a partition also allows the representation and examination of more 
complex architectures such as multiple rings of execution, as well as multithreaded and multi-
process approaches.   
The following figure shows an example separation kernel system with three blocks, three 
subjects, a set of other resources, and some designated flows. 
 
Figure 1. Example Separation Kernel Configuration 
Separation Kernel Security Functions


















































4.1 Subject-to-Block Flow Control 
Thus far, blocks have been presented as an abstract representation of the separation policy. In the 
implementation of that policy, the separation kernel will allocate subjects and other exported 
resources to blocks.  Table 2 illustrates such an allocation, i.e., a “tagging” of each subject and 
resource with its partition (per Figure 1). Of the resources described in this table, the first three 
are subjects and the remaining exported resources are passive.  Each block must have at least one 
resource allocated to it since an empty block is useless and invalid. It is worth noting that an 
active entity need not be allocated to a block, and some blocks might contain only a subject, 
however the latter might be considered to be rather hypothetical and unlikely in concrete 
implementations. Every resource is allocated to one and only one block. Consequently, we can 
state that the blocks of the separation kernel constitute a partition (in the mathematical sense) 
where: R is the nonempty set of resources r and B is a nonempty set of subsets of R such that 
each element of R belongs to exactly one of the elements of B. From elementary set theory, it is 
known that a partition, B, can be used to create an equivalence relation on R. Thus we may induce 
that the allocation of resources to partitions creates equivalence classes. 
 











Table 2.   Resource to Block Allocation 
 
Having provided a means of distinguishing different subjects within a block, we can formulate a 
flow policy in which different subjects of a block are allowed to have different flows, to various 
blocks. This allows the flow policy from Figure 1 to be expressed in terms of subjects and blocks 
as illustrated in the access matrix of Table 3. 
 
Subjects Block A Block B Block C 
1 RWX - - 
2 RWX W - 
3 - RWX W 
Table 3.  Subject-to-Block Flow Rules 
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The application domain attributes used to determine the allocation of resources to blocks, together 
with the flow rules, define a specific policy.  Examples include non-discretionary policies that 
restrict information flow based upon confidentiality or integrity requirements. Non-security 
attributes could also be used as the basis for the partitioning. For example, if CPU time is 
described as a set of time units, the scheduling policy could be used to define blocks, with some 
blocks allocated more time units than others.  
Within a block, it may be necessary to perform certain transformations on information that 
change its security attributes.  For example, encryption may be viewed as a transformation of 
information from sensitive to unsensitive; a guard [2] performs information review and 
downgrading functions; and a quality assurance manager transforms prototype code into 
production code by regarding it in terms of reliability.  For each of these transformation and 
transactional examples there may be several subjects within a block performing various aspects of 
the task at hand. The principle of least privilege requires that each of these subjects be given only 
the privileges required to do its particular task and no more.  The separation kernel can support 
this objective by assigning access rights appropriately to the subjects within the block. 
4.2 Subject-to-Resource Flow Control 
Just as we provided subjects within a partition with different flow rules, we can also define 
separate rules for accessing different resources within a block.  Table 4 illustrates how allocations 
to support the principle of least privilege are possible when the separation kernel supports per-
subject and per-resource flow-control granularity: no subject is given more access than what is 






 Resource ID 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 - RW - RW - - - - - - 
2 RW - - - R W - - - - 
3 - - - - - RW - - W - 
Table 4.  Subject-to-Resource Flow Matrix 
Together, Tables 2 and 4 show abstract structures required to allow only the flows illustrated in 
Figure 1.  It is clear from that the corresponding Block-to-Block flow matrix in Table 1, by itself, 
would allow many more flows than those illustrated in Figure 1.   
An example of a useful application scenario for least privilege separation is that of a down-
grader, shown in Figure 2.  Block D would be unclassified, Blocks A, B and C would be 
classified, and Block C would hold the downgrader program.  An untrusted initiator (UInit) 
process in A would write selected classified information to a classified holder buffer in Block A.  
An untrusted copier process would move the contents of the holder to the dirty search workspace 
in Block B. An untrusted dirty-word search process  (UDWS) in B would provide advisory 
confirmation that the information was “suitable” for downgrading and copy the information into 
the clean results buffer (note that this process’s actions would be considered “advisory” with 
respect to the multilevel policy, rather than “trusted,” since it has no capability to actually violate 
the policy, nor to guarantee that the information is actually suitable for downgrading).  Then the 
trusted downgrader (TDG) program in C would read the information from the results buffer and 
write it to an unclassified receiver buffer in D where it may be accessed by an untrusted end-point 
process (UEnd).  As constrained by least privilege provided by the subject-to-resource flow 
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matrix, the downgrader process in Block C would not be able to read from any resource other 
than the clean results and not be able to write to any resource in D other than the receiver.  This 
would limit damage in the event of errors, for example in the downgrader, initiator or search 
processes, and contributes to a substantive argument that only the downgrader program need be 
trusted with respect to the application-level multilevel policy (viz., depended on to write down 
only when appropriate), and thus requiring of security verification with respect to that policy. 
 
 
Separation Kernel Security Functions 
Block A 
u 
Block B Block D 
UInit UDWS TDG 







Classified Classified Classified Unclass 
 
 
Figure 2. Trusted Downgrader. Dark areas with white text are trusted. 
4.3 Alternative to Enforcement Of Least Privilege at Subject/Resource Level 
An alternate conceptual approach to achieving the principle of least privilege for a system that 
enforces a Block-to-Block policy without a Subject-to-Resource matrix is through the use of a 
minimal configuration.  A minimal configuration of a system is where, for all pairs of blocks, X 
and Y, all of the subjects of block X require for their functionality, and are given, the same access 
to all of the resources of block Y. Note that X and Y may be the same or different blocks, and the 
access given may be empty for a given pair of blocks.  By definition, then, the Block-to-Block 
matrix for a system in a minimal configuration does not provide any more access than what is 
required. However, it is clear that minimal configurations are far less expressive than the more 
general configuration utilizing the Subject-to-Resource matrix, and would not be suitable for 
many types of secure systems, such as those that support execute-only memory.   
5 Least Privilege Separation Model  
This section provides a formal presentation and discussion of the least privilege separation model 
that supports two orthogonal flow policies: 1) block-to-block flow control and 2) least privilege 
flow control between subjects and resources. 
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The system elements of a least privilege separation model are: a set of resources R, a set of 
operations O, a set of modes of flow F, a partitioning of resources into a set of blocks B, an 
operation-to-effects function MM, a block-to-block flow function BB, and a subject-to-resource 
flow function SR: 
system = (R, O, F, B, MM, BB, SR) 
Given the set of resources R and the partition of those resources B, we derive the function RB: 
RB : R → B  
such that RB(r) = b if and only if resource r ∈ R is an element of block b ∈ B. Since B is 
a partition of R each element of R is in exactly one element of B.   
We also provide a rule for interpreting the elements to define a secure system (see below). The 
model, representing a system with static resource assignments and static security policy, does not 
include any changes to the system elements: all functions are constant.   
The set of resources, R, represents the totality of all hardware, firmware, software and data that 
are executed, utilized, created, protected or exported by the separation kernel. Resources are 
virtualized by the separation kernel such that each block’s resources appear to be entirely its own.  
For example, memory may be virtualized into address spaces and/or objects that are assigned to 
blocks.  The CPU may be virtualized into scheduling units that are assigned to individual blocks 
(e.g., cpu_unit(1..n)). For example:  
RB(cpu_unit.1) = b 
Resources are divided into internal resources Ri, which are reserved for the kernel’s own use and 
exported resources Re , which are accessible through a defined interface to the kernel: 
Ri ⊂ R 
Re ⊂ R 
Ri ∩ Re = ∅ 
Subjects are abstractions created and controlled by the separation kernel that represent the active 
entities of the system (e.g., program, process, agent). Each subject rs ∈ Rs is a resource from Re, 
thus:  
Rs ⊂ Re 
Each mode of flow f is selected from the set F.   The mode indicates the direction of information 
flow between two entities, such as between a subject and a resource. F includes read and 
write, where semantically, write is a one directional flow from the subject to the resource 
that does not include the inverse flow (read).  The modeling of an execute mode will depend 
on the system implementation, for example whether the hardware allows an execute_only mode 
of access, and whether the resulting flow (if any) is different from read with respect to the 
policy.  
The set of all possible flow effects E is constructed from RS x R x F.  A flow effect, e, defines 
a flow between a subject and a resource (direct flows between non-active resources are not 
allowed): 
e = (rs, r, f) 
Each operation, o ∈ O, available to subjects is associated by function MM with a set of flow 
effects, which may be the empty set, from the power set, ℘, of E: 
MM: O → ℘(E)  
The function MM represents all the flows between pairs of resources that will be actualized by 
system operations. 
The function SR defines the set of allowed flow relations between subjects and external 
resources, the least privilege flow policy:  
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SR: Rs x Re → ℘(F)  
The function BB defines the set of allowed flow relations between blocks, called a 
BB_flowset,  which is the system block-to-block flow policy:  
BB: B x B → ℘(F)   
The functions BB and SR can be represented as matrices with subsets of F as the elements of the 
matrix, and are so illustrated elsewhere in this document.   
From the set of relationships defined by BB, we can determine in which direction the information 
may flow between blocks. The shorthand FLOWS(BB,a,b) means that information may flow 
from block a to block b, implying that either BB(a, b) = write, or BB(b, a) = read 
must be true, or there exists a block c such that FLOWS(BB,a,c) and FLOWS(BB,c,b).  
FLOWS(BB,a,a) is implicit for all a ∈ B. 
If information is allowed to flow circularly in a set of blocks, e.g. in both directions between two 
blocks, then a logical equivalence class of information results, since all information can be shared 
between the blocks. While the subject-to-resource flow controls can be used to prevent inter-
block flows otherwise allowed by the block-to-block flow rules, it is generally intractable to 
determine which information in a block will be (e.g., transitively) allowed to flow into another 
block once the flow is allowed by a block-to-block flow rule and a subject-to-resource flow rule.  
Thus, to provide a meaningful partitioning of resources, we would like the inter-block flows 
defined by BB to be partially ordered  (PO):   
PO(B,BB) ⇔ 
 ∀i,j,k ∈ B( 
FLOWS(BB,i,i) (true by definition) 
  & 
  FLOWS(BB,i,j) & FLOWS(BB,j,i) -> i = j 
  & 
  FLOWS(BB,i,j) & FLOWS(BB,j,k) 
-> FLOWS(BB,i,k) (true by definition)) 
In some cases, flows between blocks in contradiction of the partial ordering are useful when 
constructing an application (e.g., to support a guard or downgrader application), and may be 
considered secure if it can be assured that only the desired information can flow as intended. 
Therefore, if such an inter-block flow were allowed by BB, we would require that any subject 
(e.g., application) allowed by SR to utilize the flow must have a level of assurance that is 
adequate to protect the information in both the source and the destination blocks.  We refer to 
such a subject as a trusted subject.  Trusted subjects are a subset of the set of all subjects:  
Rt  ⊂  Rs 
Given a partial ordering relation for B, Bbase, a trusted partial ordering for the system is 
defined as follows, where Bcontra is a subset of BB that potentially contains flows in 
contradiction to those identified in Bbase: 
TPO(system, Bbase) ⇔  
 ∃ Bcontra: BB_flowset (   




∀ rs, r ∈  R; f ∈  F( 
(f ∈  Bcontra(RB(rs), RB(r))  
&  
f ∈  SR(rs,r) 
 14 
   & 
   ~PO(B,(Bbase ∪ ((RB(rs), RB(r)) = f))) 
   ) 
    ⇒ rs ∈ Rt 
) ) 
A system is secure with respect to the least privilege separation model if and only if all of the 
flows implemented by system operations meet the block-to-block and least privilege flow policies 
and the system provides a trusted partial ordering with respect to an identified partial ordering 
of B: 
SECURE(system, Bbase) ⇔   
∀ e ∈ E, o ∈ O ( 
e ∈ MM(o)  
⇒ e.f ∈ BB(RB(e.rs), RB(e.r))   (1) 
& 
e.r ∈ Ri  e.f ∈ SR(e.rs, e.r)  (2) 
   )   
&  
TPO(system, Bbase) 
5.1 Discussion of the Model 
The intention is that SR represents a subset of the flows of BB, to provide an additional “least 
privilege” restriction to BB, but validity of the security predicate does not depend on this subset 
relationship.  The formulation of SR to reflect the least amount of privilege required for a subject 
to perform its functions is assumed to occur during installation of the system’s applications, by 
personnel familiar with each specific application.  Since the applications will be fixed in a given 
static embedded system, this appears to be a reasonable expectation.  In more dynamic systems, 
more algorithmic approaches [42] to determining and/or assigning “least” privileges might be in 
order. 
Note that flow effects are specified in terms of the flows between all possible subjects RS and 
resources R.  Since R includes both internal and exported resources, all possible system flows are 
represented, and therefore the desired block separation property is represented, as well as the 
control of flow between blocks and the ability to enforce least privilege.  If BB is empty, then the 
system is configured with a strict separation policy, viz., allowing no flows between blocks.  If E 
were taken to represent only exported resources, then this model would need to assume the 
separation property regarding internal resources, either implicitly, axiomatically, or through the 
inclusion of additional properties [38][26].    
One approach to formal system verification with this model would be to let E represent only 
exported resources, map the formal system specification to the model, and let a comprehensive 
covert channel analysis of the system and specifications provide the evidence for separation of 
internal resources.  An alternative would be to let E represent both internal and exported 
resources, and provide a formal system specification that is at the same level of detail and 
abstraction as the system implementation – enabling the representation of all internal and external 
flows.  The latter alternative, to be practical for a system of useful size, would seem to require 
either the ability to automatically generate a detailed specification from an abstract model, or 
automatically generate the code from the detailed specification, so that the system would not need 
to be implemented redundantly in separate logics (viz., specification and code).  However, 
providing such detail in the specification might defeat one of its primary purposes, which is to 
provide an understandable representation of the design.   
The characterization shown here of the relationships of the significant internal elements of a static 
separation system results in a simple, yet complete model of the desired security policy. Since the 
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system in execution will not allow changes to “flows” granted or implemented, constant functions 
are adequate for representing the security elements of the system. Some might ask whether this 
model is “too simple” to be interesting, to which we would reply that the ability to clearly 
represent the security policy of a significant class of processing engines appears to be useful. As a 
precursor to further development, we have represented this model in the Ina Jo specification 
language [40], and proven that information flows resulting from representative system calls are 
bound by the security predicate (Ina Jo was chosen for its built-in support for inter-level mapping, 
which will be utilized when proving that the formal system specification conforms to the formal 
model). 
It could be argued that some of the traditional separation kernel models could allow a granular 
definition of blocks, thereby providing “least privilege;” for example if each subject and resource 
were assigned to their own block.  However, such a definition would eliminate the ability of those 
“one-dimensional” models (recall that our model presents two orthogonal sub-policies) to portray 
a higher-level policy regarding flows between equivalence classes of subjects and resources, such 
as is useful in dealing with multilevel security at the application level.  
In an ideal system, no covert timing or storage channels will be present.   In an implementation, 
covert channels between blocks would be visible as a violation to (1) for a particular e, where 
e.r is an internal resource. One sort of timing channel might show up as the modification to the 
length of an internal structure by one subject, which is indirectly visible to a subject in another 
block. Since the channel is via an internal resource, it can only be accessed indirectly and not 
directly via a kernel “handle” or name of some sort. The observing subject would measure the 
difference in the length of the structure through observing the difference in its own execution 
time for an operation that accessed that structure. Similarly, exhaustion of the same internal 
resource might result in an error message, and corresponding storage channel. 
A modular foundational component such as a separation kernel may be intended to support 
systems that provide and enforce more general and flexible policies.  To minimize the expense of 
building and evaluating the larger systems, it would be ideal to be able to use the formal model 
and other verification evidence of the separation kernel, without re-verification of the kernel 
itself.  One can then anticipate the need to formally compose the separation kernel model with the 
general-purpose model of the larger system.  Additional research is needed to investigate 
approaches for the composition of the principle of least privilege separation model with other 
formal models. 
5.2 Implementation Considerations 
Inter-process communications can be implemented in a system as direct subject-to-subject 
operations, or indirectly via different sorts of communication and synchronization resources (e.g., 
synchronization objects [35]).  The Subject-to-Resource matrix will allow either of these types of 
communications to be modeled.  
The class of separation kernels we are concerned with utilizes memory-mapped I/O, such that 
input and output between programs and devices occurs via memory segments that are in the 
address space of the program.  Therefore, whether devices are in the kernel, or are themselves 
active entities (subjects) in the user domain, they need not be represented explicitly in the model. 
6 Related Work 
6.1 Separation Kernel Formal Models  
Rushby [38] provided the seminal effort on the formal modeling of separation kernels. This work 
modeled the separation between blocks (referred to as “regimes”) of a partitioned system, such 
that the active entity(s) of a block cannot perceive, by observing their own input and output, 
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whether or not there are any other blocks present on the system.  The Rushby model does not 
represent the control of flows between blocks.  In contrast, the work presented here models the 
security of a system in terms of the separation and control of allowed inter-block flows, as well as 
the control of flows to achieve least privilege. 
Hartman [19] extended the Rushby model to represent the control of communication between 
blocks (where each “process” of the model represented its own block).  The model was developed 
for a separation kernel to run on the SCOMP processor, which featured four hardware-privilege 
levels of execution within each process [16]. Communication between blocks is modeled as 
occurring via memory buffers.  Although the SCOMP hardware provided four privilege levels, 
control of flows within a block (e.g., applied to threads or subjects assigned to different privilege 
levels of a SCOMP process) is not represented, nor is flow control with respect to resources other 
than memory buffers, so the “least privilege” control we describe is not representable using this 
model.  
The MASK formal model, briefly described by Martin [26], characterizes the separation of blocks 
(referred to as “cells”), as well as the control of message-based communication between blocks, 
but does not represent the ability to provide least privilege with respect to resources or activities 
within a block (cell). 
Alves-Foss [1] provides a formal model for multilevel security enforcement by message-passing 
applications, such as multilevel secure network interface units, that are to be built on a separation 
kernel.  This model assumes the effective separation between blocks, and provides a framework 
specifying the secure behavior of applications, which utilize allowed flows between blocks.  It 
does not describe the granularity of control required to represent the principle of least privilege. 
Schellhorn, et al [41] describe a formal model that includes non-interference between blocks 
(called “applications”), as well as a mandatory access control (MAC) policy regarding both 
confidentiality and integrity for references to resources within a block. There is one subject per 
block, which is associated with a set of private resources (“files”). A “channel” mechanism is 
defined to allow inter-block communication at the granularity of blocks, but to no greater 
granularity, so the principle of least privilege is not applicable to inter-block accesses.  The MAC 
mechanism allows least privilege to be enforced on a subject’s access to resources within its own 
block, but least privilege restrictions are not expressible for active entities at a finer granularity 
than the entire application/subject/block.  
Recently, Greve, et al [18] provided a model for a separation kernel accompanied by a description 
of several derived properties and the abstract specification for a secure guard application based on 
the model.  This model represents flow control at the granularity of memory segments within a 
block (referred to as a “partition”), which has the potential to represent the principle of least 
privilege with respect to resources within a block.  This model differs from ours, however, in that 
it does not include logic for expressing a higher-level policy regarding flows between blocks. 
6.2 Protection Profiles for Separation Kernels  
The Common Criteria security evaluation paradigm includes a document called a protection 
profile that specifies the security functionality and assurance for an entire class of IT products, as 
well as a document called a security target, which provides a similar specification for a specific 
IT product.  The protection profile is evaluated for consistency with the Common Criteria 
requirements for protection profiles; the security target is evaluated for consistency with the 
Common Criteria requirements for security targets, as well as for consistency with an identified 
protection profile (if any); and finally the product is evaluated against the security target. [4]  
A protection profile for high assurance “partitioning kernels” was initiated under the auspices of 
The Open Group by a team directed by the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company and the Air 
Force Research Laboratory. A draft of this protection profile was produced in March of 2002 [31] 
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for the National Security Agency. This protection profile does not address the principle of least 
privilege. 
To complement this effort we are part of a group writing a high robustness protection 
profile for separation kernels under the Common Criteria [31]. The proposed inclusion of a 
least privilege requirement in this protection profile is being reviewed by the group. 
6.3 Trusted Computing Exemplar Project 
Separation kernel technology is being applied in our Trusted Computing Exemplar project[21]. 
This ongoing effort is intended to produce a high assurance least privilege separation kernel[31].  
The primary security function of our Separation Kernel is to enforce subject and block separation, 
while providing primitive operating system services sufficient to support simple applications.  
The embedded focus of the kernel drives several high-level design characteristics. It will have a 
static runtime resource configuration and its security policy regarding access to resources will be 
based on static process/resource access bindings, which are subject to offline configuration (e.g., 
via an access matrix, such as are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 4). The kernel will create and support 
a fixed number of application-level processes established by the system configuration.  
Application processes will be scheduled in static fashion with each process being given a 
predetermined amount of time, set by the configuration.  The static nature of resource allotment 
will provide predictable processing behavior, as well as limit the covert channels based on shared 
resource utilization [25][23][30]. Simple process synchronization primitives will also be 
provided, that can be implemented to be demonstrably free of covert channels [35]. 
6.4 Separation Kernels for Virtual Machine Monitors 
By providing virtualization of all resources, including the hardware, a VMM 
[17][33][22]provides a rigorous form of separation and can be considered a subset of the general 
class of separation kernels. There are a number of VMM efforts and products where notions from 
separation kernel technology are potentially applicable. Both Connectix [8] and VMware [10]  
virtualize popular PC processors. VMware is a component of the NetTop prototype [28] being 
developed by the government. The ultimate objective of the NetTop effort is to provide virtual 
machines at different classification levels on a single commodity PC. The Xen project is 
constructing a highly efficient, open source virtual machine monitor [3]. A specialized system 
with an embedded virtual machine is the planned for the Software Defined Radio [14]. It will take 
advantage of the Advanced INFOSEC Machine VLSI chip to support radio-based security 
including, key management, multi-algorithm management, multiple channel communications, 
isolation of plain text from cipher text, and separation of internal sensitive processing from 
external unclassified processing. The target applications for this technology are the U.S. 
Government Digital Modular Radio and the Joint Tactical Radio System [24][7].  
Both the Terra architecture [15] and Microsoft’s NGSCB (previously called Palladium) 
[5][11][29][12] present a specialized virtual machine monitor that will partition the system into 
exactly two domains, trusted and untrusted, where different operating systems will be executed. 
In both cases, commodity software can be executed in the open or untrusted virtual machines.  
The trusted/closed VMs are isolated so that neither the platform owner nor malicious software is 
able to observe or modify their contents. For these VMMs, the principle of least privilege is 
essential so that the operating systems executing in the VMs can be protected from the 
applications and the VMM itself can be protected from both. 
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7 Conclusion 
The separation kernel abstraction and the principle of least privilege are significant tools for the 
protection of critical system resources.  Separation kernels are increasingly being used as a 
foundation in systems to provide such protection.  It is important that a model suitable for high 
assurance is available for the evaluation of these systems. In this paper, we presented the least 
privilege separation model, which is the fusion of the separation abstraction and the least 
privilege principle.  
In addition to the inter-block flow control policy prescribed by the traditional separation kernel 
paradigm, our proposed approach supports an orthogonal finer-grained flow control policy by 
extending the granularity of protected elements to subjects and resources, as well as blocks, in a  
partitioned system. We showed how least privilege applied to the actions of external subjects 
provides enhanced protection for secure systems, and also discussed how subject abstraction is a 
critical tool for information flow and security analysis. 
We examined the relationship of allowed inter-block flows to resulting policies enforced on 
separation kernel applications.  An interesting observation is that if the flows between blocks are 
partially ordered, then the separation kernel can be seen to enforce a multilevel-secure mandatory 
access control policy (assuming that the partial ordering is maintained in a global and persistent 
manner).  We have introduced the notion of a trusted partial ordering to describe flows between 
blocks that are contrary to the multilevel policy. Another observation is that circular flows 
between blocks do not result in a partial ordering, unless all of the blocks involved in the 
circularity are collapsed into a single equivalence class (meta-block).   
In summary, application of the principle of least privilege, resource separation and controlled 
sharing are synergistic security properties in a separation kernel.  Each subject is only given a 
minimum set of logically separated resources necessary to perform its assigned task, and the 
sharing of resources between subjects is rigorously controlled by the kernel.  A separation kernel 
that correctly implements these properties can meet the objective to minimize and confine 
damage with a high level of assurance. 
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